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A scheme for quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) network is proposed with a sequence
of polarized single photons. The single photons are prepared originally in the same state |0〉 by the
servers on the network, which will reduce the difficulty for the legitimate users to check eavesdropping
largely. The users code the information on the single photons with two unitary operations which do
not change their measuring bases. Some decoy photons, which are produced by operating the sample
photons with a Hadamard, are used for preventing a potentially dishonest server from eavesdropping
the quantum lines freely. This scheme is an economical one as it is the easiest way for QSDC network
communication securely.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
The combination of the principles in quantum mechan-
ics and the theory of information produces some novel
applications, such as quantum computer and quantum
communication [1]. Quantum key distribution (QKD) [2]
provides a secure way for two remote parties, Bob and
Charlie to create a private key with which they can com-
municate securely by using Vernam one-time pad crypto-
system. The non-cloning theorem and the quantum cor-
relation of an entangled quantum system ensure the se-
curity of QKD. In 1984, Bennett and Brassard (BB84) [3]
proposed an original point-to-point QKD scheme based
on the non-cloning theorem. As the state of each single
photon is produced by choosing randomly one of the two
measuring bases (MBs), the rectilinear basis σz and the
diagonal basis σx, a vicious eavesdropper, Eve will in-
evitably disturb the quantum systems and leave a mark
in the results if she eavesdrops the quantum line. More-
over, she cannot obtain all the information about the
single-photon state because an unknown quantum state
cannot be cloned. Now, there have been some point-to-
point QKD schemes proposed [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
Recently, a novel concept, quantum secure direct com-
munication (QSDC) was prosed and actively pursued by
some groups [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. With QSDC,
the two authorized users, say the sender Bob and the re-
ceiver Charlie can exchange their secret message directly
without creating a private key to encrypting the message.
There are two types of QSDC schemes. One is based on
entangled states, such as those in Refs [10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. The other is
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based on single photons. Typical such QSDC protocols
are the ones presented in Refs. [27, 28, 29, 30]. Obvi-
ously, the ones with single photons are more convenient
for the users at the aspect of measurements than those
with entangled states. The message in the two point-to-
point QSDC protocols proposed by Schimizu and Imoto
[27] and Beige et al. [28] cannot be read out until an
additional classical bit is transmitted for each qubit. We
[29] proposed a QSDC scheme with a sequence of single
photons, and Cai et al. [30] introduced a QSDC proto-
col with a single photon following some ideas in Bennett
1992 QKD protocol [32].
A general case of practical applications of QSDC re-
quires that an authorized user on a network can exchange
the secret message directly with another one. That is,
QSDC network schemes are useful in practical. There are
some servers who provide the service for preparing and
measuring the quantum signal for the legitimate users
(the number is much lager than that of the servers),
which will make the quantum communication between
the legitimate users more convenient than those in point-
to-point QSDC protocols [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31] as it
reduces the setups for the normal users, the same as that
in a classical communication network. Although there
are a few QSDC network schemes existing based on en-
tanglements [33, 34, 35, 36], none with single photons.
Certainly, an ideal single-photon source is not available
for a practical application at present, but people believe
that it can be produce without difficulty in a nearly fu-
ture with the development of technology [37]. Thus, it
is interesting, in theory, to study the model for QSDC
network with single photons.
In this paper, we introduce an economical QSDC net-
work scheme with single photons. The server provides the
service for preparing and measuring the quantum signals,
a sequence of single photons S, which will simplify the au-
thorized users’ setups for secret communication largely.
2Different from QKD network protocols, the server first
sends the quantum signals to the receiver who encrypts
them with local unitary operations and then sends them
to the sender. The secret message is encoded directly on
the single photons after confirming their security. All the
parties, including the servers, agree that the initial states
of the single photons are |0〉, which will reduce the diffi-
culty for the users to check eavesdropping. This QSDC
network protocol is an optimal one.
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FIG. 1: The subsystem of the present QSDC network. MA,
MB and MC represent the measurements done by Alice, Bob
and Charlie, respectively; E1-E3 represent the eavesdropping
done by Eve in different processes. CB and CC are the codes
done by Bob and Charlie, respectively.
II. QSDC NETWORK WITH SINGLE PHOTONS
Although a QSDC network is a composite system, its
subsystem can be simplified to three parts, the server
(Alice), the sender (Bob) and the receiver (Charlie), sim-
ilar to QKD network [38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43]. That is, a
great number of these subsystems compose of the whole
network. Similar to the classical network communica-
tion, for each request of the legitimate users, the server
analyzes it and then performs a relevant operation, for
example, connecting the user to another one on the net-
work or sending a sequence of single photons to the user.
Moreover, all the users and the servers agree that the
server of the branch with the receiver provides the service
for preparing and measuring the quantum signal, and all
other servers only provide the service for connecting the
quantum line for these two legitimate users in a certain
time slot if the sender and the receiver do not exist in a
branch of the network. Thus, a QSDC network scheme
is explicit if the principle of its subsystem is described
clearly.
The subsystem in our QSDC network scheme is shown
in Fig.1. Alice provides the service for preparing and
measuring the polarized single photons. The single pho-
tons S0 are prepared initially in the same states |+ z〉 ≡
|0〉. Here | + z〉 is an eigenvector of the MB σz . Alice
sends the photons S0 first to the receiver Charlie who
stores them and checks the security of the transmission.
The procedure for checking eavesdropping includes two
parts. One is used to check whether the sample pho-
tons are in the same state |0〉 or not, which can be com-
pleted by measuring half the samples with the MB σz .
The other is used to check whether there are more than
one photon in each signal. That is, Charlie should for-
bid others eavesdrop the quantum communication with
a multi-photon fake signal attack [44]. This task can be
accomplished with some photon beam splitters (PBSs),
similar to Ref. [44]. In detail, Charlie splits each signal
in the half of the samples remaining with three PBSs,
shown in Fig.2, and then measures each signal with a
single-photon detector. If there is only one photon in the
initial signal, only one detector will be clicked in theory.
Otherwise, the number of the detectors clicked is more
than one with a large probability.
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FIG. 2: The principle of the check against multiphoton fake
signal attack, similar to Ref. [44]. PBS presents a photon
beam splitter 50/50, and Di (i = 1, 2, 3, 4 ) are four single-
photon detectors.
If the receiver Charlie confirms that there is no eaves-
dropper monitoring the quantum line between the server
and him, he operates each photon in the sequence S0
with one of the two local operations U0 = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|
and U1 = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0| randomly. He keeps the secret
about his operations CC . In order to check eavesdrop-
ping efficiently, he should also insert some decoy photons
in the sequence S0. That is, Charlie picks up randomly
some sample photons (the number is not very large, just
enough for doing the error rate analysis, about the num-
ber of samples for eavesdropping check in BB84 QKD
protocol), say Se from the sequence S0 after his oper-
ations with U0 and U1, and performs a Hadamard (H)
operation on each one. The H operation will make the
photons in Se in the state | + x〉 = 1√2 (|0〉 + |1〉) or
| − x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). That is, the states of the photons
in the sequence S0 are nonorthogonal, which will forbid
the eavesdroppers to eavesdrop the information on the
states freely. After these operations, Charlie sends the
sequence SC (the sequence S0 after Charlie’s operations)
to the sender Bob.
After Bob receives the sequence SC , Charlie chooses
randomly some photons from the sequence SC as the
3samples for checking eavesdropping and tells their posi-
tions to Bob. The samples include all the photons oper-
ated with a H operation Se and some other photons with
only the operation U0 or U1. Charlie tells Bob the MBs of
the samples and requires him to announce his outcomes
obtained by measuring the samples with the same MBs
as those of Charlie’s. Simultaneously, Bob can also use
the same way as Charlie’s to determine whether there
are more than one photons in each sample. The error
rate analysis on the samples can be accomplished by the
receiver Charlie. That is, he compares the outcomes pub-
lished by Bob with his own operations on the samples. If
they believe that the quantum line is secure, Bob codes
his secret message CB on the photons remaining in the se-
quence SC by choosing the operation U0 or U1 according
to the bit is 0 or 1, respectively. Certainly, Bob should
add a small trick in the sequence SC before he sends it
out. That is, he should select some of the photons in the
sequence SC as the samples for checking the security of
the transmission between him and the server Alice, and
operates them with U0 or U1 randomly. Then he sends
the photons encoded, say SB to Alice who measures them
with the MB σz . Alice announces the outcomes of her
measurements in public, i.e., CA = CC ⊕ CB. After Bob
and Charlie check eavesdropping with the photons oper-
ated by Bob using U0 and U1 randomly, Charlie can read
out the secret message CB = CA ⊕ CC directly if the
transmission of whole quantum communication is secure.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. the relation between the information leaked and
the probability detected
In this QSDC network scheme, there are three pro-
cesses for checking eavesdropping, i.e., one for the trans-
mission between the server Alice and the receiver Charlie,
one between Charlie and the sender Bob, and the other
one between Bob and Alice. Although an eavesdropper,
say Eve (including a dishonest server Alice), can eaves-
drop the quantum communication between the two par-
ties of the transmission in each process, say E1, E2 and
E3 (see Fig. 1), the eavesdropping checks can forbid her
to monitor the quantum line freely, as the process of each
transmission is similar to that in BB84 QKD protocol [3]
which is proven unconditionally secure with error correc-
tion and privacy amplification [45]. That is, Eve’s action
will be detected by Charlie and Bob before Bob encodes
his message on the photons.
In detail, with the eavesdropping E1, Eve can only ob-
tain the information about the initial states of the pho-
tons, which is known to every one, not a secret. If Eve
wants to steal the information about the operations CC ,
she should insert some Trojan-horse photons in the orig-
inal signal or intercept the photons operated by Charlie
and measure them. Obviously, her actions will inevitably
leave a trace in the first or second process for eavesdrop-
ping check. The reason is that the Trojan-horse photons
will be found out when Charlie measures the samples
with some PBSs as there are more than one detector
clicked for each original signal received from Alice. If Eve
exploits the intercept-resending attack to steal the infor-
mation about Charlie’s operations CC , her action will in-
troduce some errors in the outcomes of the measurements
on the samples in the second process for eavesdropping
check, the same as that in BB84 protocol [3]. The eaves-
dropping on the last stage E3 (the transmission between
Bob and Alice) will give Eve nothing about the message
CB as it is encrypted by the operations CC [2, 29]. In a
word, Eve cannot steal the information about the secret
message CB freely in an ideal condition. If the noise in
the quantum line is not very small, the case is different.
We discuss it as follows.
Similar to Ref. [33, 46], we can also use the relation of
the error rate and the correspondent maximal amount of
information obtainable for an eavesdropper from a pho-
ton with E2 to demonstrate the security of the quantum
channel between Charlie and Bob. As Bob checks eaves-
dropping by choosing the two MBs σz and σx for the
samples, the same as the BB84 QKD protocol [3], the
eavesdropping done by Eve can be realized by a unitary
operation, say, Eˆ on a larger Hilbert space. That is, Eve
can perform the unitary transformation Eˆ on the photon
sent by Charlie (say photon C) and the ancilla whose
state is initially in |0〉 [33, 46].
Eˆ|0〉C |0〉 =
√
F |0〉|e00〉+
√
D|1〉|e01〉, (1)
Eˆ|1〉C |0〉 =
√
D|0〉|e10〉+
√
F |1〉|e11〉, (2)
Eˆ|+ x〉C |0〉 = 1√
2
[
√
F (|0〉|e00〉+ |1〉|e11〉)
+
√
D(|1〉|e01〉+ |0〉|e10〉)], (3)
Eˆ| − x〉C |0〉 = 1√
2
[
√
F (|0〉|e00〉+ |1〉|e11〉)
−
√
D(|1〉|e01〉+ |0〉|e10〉)], (4)
where F is the fidelity of the state of the photon C after
the eavesdropping, D is the probability that Bob and
Charlie can detect Eve’s action. As the operation Eˆ is a
unitary one, we have the relations as follows
〈e00|e00〉+ 〈e01|e01〉 = F +D = 1, (5)
〈e10|e10〉+ 〈e11|e11〉 = D + F = 1, (6)
〈e00|e10〉+ 〈e01|e11〉 = 0. (7)
After the eavesdropping check, Bob encodes his mes-
sage on the photons in the eigenvectors of the MB σz
with the operations U0 and U1. As the states of the sam-
ples are random for any eavesdropper, the photon C is in
the state ρC =
1
2
(
1 0
0 1
)
. After the unitary operation
Eˆ, the final state of the photon B and the ancilla e is
described as follows [33, 47].
ε(ρC) = P0εU0(ρC) + P1εU1(ρC), (8)
4where P0 and P1 are the probabilities encoded with the
operation U0 and U1, and εU0 and εU1 are quantum op-
erations describing the evolution of the initial state ρC ,
i.e.,
εUi(ρC) = UiEˆρC ⊗ |e〉〈e|Eˆ+U+i . (9)
The accessible information extracted from the state ε(ρC)
is no more than the Holevo bound [11, 33, 47], i.e.,
IEve ≤ S(ε(ρC))− [P0S(εU0(ρC)) + P1S(εU1(ρC))]
≡ Imax, (10)
where S(ρ) is the von-Neumann entropy of the state ρ,
i.e.,
S(ρ) = −Tr{ρlog2ρ} =
3∑
i=0
−λi log2 λi, (11)
where λi are the roots of the characteristic polynomial
det(ρ− λI) [11].
Suppose that Bob chooses the same probability for
choosing the two operations U0 and U1, i.e., P0 = P1 =
1/2, we can obtain the relation between Imax and the
probability D as follows when Eve measures the com-
posite system with the basis {|0〉|e00〉, |0〉|e01〉, |1〉|e00〉,
|1〉|e01〉} which spans the generic subspace of the Hilbert
space HC ⊗He support of ε(ρˆC)
Imax = −Dlog2D − (1−D)log2(1−D). (12)
That is, the probability of being detected D will increase
if Eve wants to steal more information about the secret
message. If the error rate introduced by noise is not zero,
Bob should exploit the single-photon quantum privacy
amplification method [48] to reduce the leakage largely.
B. quantum privacy amplification for single qubits
In brief, the principle of the quantum privacy amplifi-
cation for two single photons can be described as follows
[48]. It includes two controlled-not (CNOT) gates and an
H gate, shown in Fig.3. Suppose the original states of
the photon 1 and photon 2 are |ϕ〉1 = a1|0〉 + b1|1〉 and
|ϕ〉2 = a2|0〉 + b2|1〉, respectively. After the operation,
the qubit 2 is measured with the MB σz and the infor-
mation of its original state is incorporated into photon 1
as
|ψ〉out =
1√
2
{(a1a2 + b1b2) |0〉1 + (a1b2 − b1a2) |1〉1} |0〉2
+
1√
2
{(a1a2 − b1b2) |1〉1 + (a1b2 + b1a2) |0〉1} |1〉2 .
(13)
This means that the state of the control qubit ϕ〉1 will
contain the information of the state of the original target
qubit no matter what the result obtained by Bob is. In
this way, the probability that Eve gets the complete in-
formation about the output state is reduced to r2. Here
r is the original probability that Eve obtains the infor-
mation about the qubits in a noisy channel.
CNOTCNOT
1
M
2
M
out
\
1,out
MH
2,out
M
detector
FIG. 3: Quantum privacy amplification operation for two
qubits [48].
If the noise in the quantum line somewhat depolarizes
the single photons, the legitimate users can purify the
polarized single photons [49] and then perform quantum
privacy amplification on them for eliminating the infor-
mation leaked to Eve [48]. These two operations will
eliminate the effect of the noise. In this way, the secu-
rity of this QSDC network scheme is as the same as that
with an ideal quantum line. Of course, if the noise or the
loss in the quantum line is not small, this scheme is not
good for transmitting the secret message directly, but for
creating a private key efficiently.
IV. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
It is of interest to point out the advantage that the
sequence S0 is first sent to the receiver Charlie, not the
sender Bob. As the secret message CB cannot be dis-
carded, different from the outcomes in QKD, the users
have to confirm whether the quantum line between them
is secure or not [12, 29]. Only when the quantum line
is secure, the sender Bob would encode his message on
the quantum information carriers, a sequence of polarized
single photons. The operations done by Charlie CC carry
nothing about the message before Bob codes the photons.
That is, CC is just a raw key, same as that in QKD before
Bob and Charlie confirm the security of the transmission
between them, and can be discarded. But after the con-
firmation is done by Bob and Charlie, the operations CC
become the unique private key for decrypting the mes-
sage CB . This order of the transmissions ensures that
the message CB are not revealed to Eve even though she
monitors the quantum lines. Moreover, the two users, in
this time, can exploit quantum privacy amplification to
reduce the leakage to a low level as the photons do not
carry the secret message.
Another character of this QSDC network scheme is
that the initial states prepared by the server Alice are all
|0〉. It will reduce the difficulty for the parties to check
eavesdropping. In detail, Bob and Charlie can complete
their eavesdropping check without the help of Alice’s,
5which can prevent Alice from attacking the communi-
cation with a fake signal and cheating [50]. Moreover,
Charlie can use an H operation to change a photon into
a decoy one efficiently.
Compared with the QSDC network schemes existing
[33, 34, 36], a sequence of polarized single photons is
enough, not entanglements. The users on the network
need only have the capability of performing single-photon
measurement and local unitary operations, not multipar-
tite joint measurements. Moreover, it is unnecessary for
the users to have an ideal single-photon source as the
quantum signals are prepared by the server, which will
simplify the devices of the users on the network. Same
as the point-to-point QSDC scheme [29], almost all the
photons can be used to carry the useful information in
theory. That is, the efficiency for qubits ηq approaches
100%. Except for checking eavesdropping, it is unneces-
sary for the users to exchange the classical information.
Thus this QSDC network scheme is an economical one.
Certainly, on the one hand, if the sender Bob has a
perfect device for measuring a sequence of single pho-
tons, he can send no photon to the server Alice and he
measures them himself in this network scheme. In this
way, the server Alice has more space for dealing with the
request of other users’. In essence, the server Alice only
provides the service for preparing a sequence of single
photons in this modified network scheme. On the other
hand, if a perfect device for measuring single photons
is very expensive in a practical application, the sender
Bob can send the photon sequence to the sever Alice for
determining their states. This structure will reduce the
requirements on the users’ devices largely at the expense
of Alice’s resource.
In summary, we have presented a new QSDC network
scheme with a sequence of polarized single photons S.
In this scheme, the server prepares all the quantum sig-
nals initially in the same state |0〉, which will reduce the
difficulty for the parties to check eavesdropping. After
confirming the security of the single photons encrypted
by the receiver, the sender encodes his secret message di-
rectly on them. After the server announces the combined
operations on the photons, the receiver can read out the
message directly. This scheme is an economical one as
it is the easiest way for QSDC network communication
securely. If the noise or the loss in the quantum line is
not small, the parties can use this model for creating a
private key efficiently, not exchanging the secret message.
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